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1 Introduction
Urban economics has studied innumerable aspects of differences between and within cities,
among which growth and inequality have occupied the most attention. However, as al-
ready pointed out by Glaeser et al. (1996) and Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), the prolif-
eration of contrasts related to crime is also striking and their findings are of particular
relevance to both individual and overall welfare. The recent literature suggests that indi-
vidual choices concerning participation in crime may be significantly affected by existing
norms and networks (Glaeser et al. 1996; Patacchini and Zenou 2009).
Regarding the relationship between crime and social networks, there is no clear-cut
consensus as to whether we should expect the empirical correlation to be positive or neg-
ative, whether there is a causal link (and in which direction), or what implications the
relationship may have for policy-making. On the one hand, social networks may work
as communication channels for criminals and may also offer ways to cover up criminal
activity. Recent work emphasizes that more tightly knit social networks can raise aggre-
gate crime levels due to the sharing of know-how among criminals (Calvo´-Armengol and
Zenou 2004) or imitation of peer behavior (Glaeser et al. 1996; Calvo´-Armengol et al.
2009). However, on the other hand, they also increase the opportunity cost of committing
a crime. Such a possibility is closely related to the concept of social capital, defined by
Guiso et al. (2011) as a set of values and beliefs that help cooperation within a community.
Indeed, Coleman (1988) already related the strength of social sanction to social network
closure. Additionally, systemic models of community organization are built on the notion
that well-developed local network structures reduce crime (Flaherty and Brown 2010).
This is related to the fact that networks may increase returns on non-criminal activities
and raise detection probabilities.
In this paper, we argue that initiatives that bolster community ties in disadvantaged
neighborhoods succeed at reducing local crime rates, especially for crimes that are not
driven by a monetary incentive. We test this hypothesis by analyzing a community
health policy that was implemented in a quasi-random fashion in the city of Barcelona
(Barcelona Salut als Barris, BSaB; literally, ‘health in the neighborhoods’) and using a
unique geocoded criminal offense dataset. We apply a staggered differences-in-differences
methodology combined with a battery of socioeconomic controls and time and space
fixed effects. To the best of our knowledge, no published studies have adopted such an
approach, with similarly rich data. Our estimates suggest that the observed reduction in
certain criminal actions can be attributed to the implementation of BSaB. Specifically, we
find that female victimization rates drop in those neighborhoods that benefit from BSaB.
The policy greatly reduces crimes against the person and those related to temperamental
features of the perpetrator, as well as those where there is a very close personal link
between perpetrator and victim (which we label as ‘intimate’ crimes).The reductions
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range from 9% to 18%. We also find that that the underlying mechanisms behind the
results are not due to health improvements in the participating neighborhoods, but rather
are linked to a more robust social fabric.
This research is ambitious since it deals with the impact of community ties on crime
in an urban context; a line of research that is extremely relevant to the fields of economics
of crime. Our ultimate goal is to understand better the empirical determinants of crim-
inal activity, how social networks deter or encourage them, and how they interact with
socioeconomic factors. The novelties of this research reside in many factors. Firstly, the
deployment of the policy provides us with an exogenous variation in the drivers of com-
munity ties at a very small geographical level, which allows us to determine causal links.
Secondly, we make use of a geocoded and highly detailed database that includes data on
registered victims, offenders and types of crime. This also adds to the accuracy of our
analysis, as we can analyze whether there are differential effects according to crime types,
and the demographic characteristics of those involved. Finally, this work contributes to
research conducted outside the United States and considers a city in which the residents
are heterogeneous in terms of economic and sociodemographic characteristics. Together,
these features constitute the external validity of our exercise. Our findings will contribute
to academic research and will offer specific guidance for policy-making to deter criminal
activity, moving beyond traditional approaches. Furthermore, we hope that this case
study will benefit other cities, given that the policy recommendations that emerge from
it will be applicable to similar urban settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we analyze the link between
community capital and crime. Section 3 describes the institutional framework of the
initiative we analyze. Then in Section 4 we present the data we use, and we define our
main variables. Section 5 lays out the methodology we follow as well as our empirical
model. Then after presenting our main results in Section 6, in Section 7 we offer our
conclusions and policy recommendations.
2 Brief review of community capital
Crime and social interactions have been studied in economics for quite some time. In
their seminal paper on the subject, Glaeser et al. (1996) (and also Glaeser et al. 2002)
detected a large number of social interactions in criminal behavior. Those authors present
a model in which social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain
the high cross-city variation in crime rates in the US. Additionally, their model provides
an index of social interactions: the proportion of potential criminals who respond to
social influences. The index suggests that the number of social interactions is highest in
petty crimes, moderate in more serious crimes, and almost negligible in murder and rape.
Meanwhile, there has been extensive debate in the literature regarding the related
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topic of social capital: what it actually is and how it can be measured. In this regard,
Putnam et al. (1994) set the stage for such considerations when analyzing the effects of so-
cial engagement. Ever since then, social capital has been defined and measured in several
different ways by economic researchers. For example, Tabellini (2010) measured culture
by indicators of individual values and beliefs (such as trust and respect for others) in order
to explore the issue of whether it has a causal effect on economic development. Indeed, he
finds that the exogenous component of culture due to history is strongly correlated with
current regional economic development. Taking a different approach, Nannicini et al.
(2013) investigate political accountability as a channel through which social capital may
improve economic well-being. The authors find that punishment for political misbehavior
is more severe in districts with greater social capital, approximated by blood donations.
For their part, Guiso et al. (2011) take a more theoretical perspective on social capital.
They review previous research into its role, as they understand that previous definitions
have been too vague or broad, leading to mixed results and interpretations. To resolve
such discrepancies, the authors restrict their definition of social capital to one of civic
capital, seen as a set of values and beliefs that help cooperation in a community. Finally,
Jackson (2017) provides a typology of social capital and considers seven forms: informa-
tion, brokerage, coordination and leadership, bridging, favor, reputation, and community
capital. He then defines community capital as the ability within a community to sustain
cooperative behavior in transacting, the running of institutions, the provision of public
goods, the handling of commons and externalities, or collective action. This last definition
is the one that we will use as a reference for the remainder of this paper.
Most certainly it is the case that social capital can play an important role in many
economic spheres. Among these, the economics of crime is a very important one, and
a number of papers have focused on social capital as a driver of crime at the local
geographical level (Hirschfield and Bowers 1997; Lederman et al. 2002; Buonanno et
al. 2009; Akc¸omak and Ter Weel 2012). However, the results do not present any crystal
clear conclusion. For example, while in Buonanno et al. (2009) the authors do not find a
clear effect of social capital on levels of crime, Lederman et al. (2002) state that trust has
a significant and negative effect on violent crime rates. Moreover, Akc¸omak and Ter Weel
(2012) use both historical and current data from Dutch municipalities and find a negative
correlation between social capital and crime rates. Additionally, they find that current
levels of social capital are affected by historical sociodemographic characteristics. This
last finding is also shared by Lederman et al. (2002). Also important for our research,
Hirschfield and Bowers (1997) state that there is a significant relationship between social
cohesion (measured in terms of social control and ethnic heterogeneity) and crime levels
in disadvantaged areas. They also indicate that in those areas where levels of social
cohesion are high, crime is significantly lower than otherwise expected.
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Sociologists have also devoted effort to understanding the link between social capital
and crime rates. Over the last two decades, researchers have explored social capital as a
local factor in crime prevention. Here, efforts in understanding the social pattern of crime
rely on social disorganization theory and systemic models of community attachment.
Social disorganization is defined as the inability of a community structure to realize the
common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls (Sampson 1988;
Sampson and Groves 1989). This theory has recently been linked to the concept of social
capital, defined as those features of social organization (networks, norms of reciprocity
and trust) that facilitate cooperation between citizens for mutual benefit. In fact, a
growing number of studies support the link between low social capital and high crime
rates (Rose and Clear 1998; Kennedy et al. 1998). Moreover, the systemic model of
community attachment (Flaherty and Brown 2010) emphasizes the effect of community
structural characteristics on neighborhood friendship and associational ties, and their
effect on informal social control and crime levels. The systemic model hypothesis is that
more extensive social ties decrease crime rates since communities with wider friendship
and associational ties have greater potential for informal social control, due to social
cohesion. This theoretical context provides a robust framework for our present research.
Along similar lines, Warner and Rountree (1997) analyze the role of local social ties
in mediating between structural conditions and crime rates, conditional upon neighbor-
hood characteristics. Using data from 100 Seattle census tracts, the authors find that the
extent to which friendship networks decrease crime depends in part on the racial makeup
of the neighborhood. Meanwhile Kawachi et al. (1999) present a conceptual framework
for analyzing the influence of the social context on community health, using crime as the
indicator of collective well-being. Those authors argue that two sets of societal charac-
teristics influence the level of crime: the relative degree of deprivation, and the degree
of cohesion in the social relations between citizens. Unlike Warner and Rountree (1997),
Kawachi et al. (1999) find consistent evidence in agreement with social disorganization
theory, as the strongest correlates of violent crime turned out to be indicators of social
capital. Additionally, Takagi et al. (2012) find that generalized trust, reciprocity, sup-
portive networks, and social capital within a neighborhood were inversely associated with
the probability of becoming a victim of crime.
3 Institutional Setup: Salut als Barris in Barcelona
In the framework of public policy analysis, the community component usually plays an
important role. This is why this component has been studied worldwide and several
definitions have been developed. For example, the Local Government Association of the
United Kingdom (LGA), an important reference for these matters, defines community ac-
tion as ‘any activity that increases the understanding, engagement, and empowerment of
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communities in the design and delivery of local services’ (Local Government Association
2016). Even though the activities may differ, greater engagement of local citizens is key
in the planning, design, and delivery of local services. According to the LGA, such action
can help to build a community and social capacity by creating social networks. Among
its many benefits, improving community cohesion and safety are mentioned. Moreover,
in Barcelona the local authorities define community action as ‘a process of stimulating
cooperative social relationships between members of a community (neighborhoods, city
blocks, blocks of flats, etc.), a human collective that shares a space and a sense of be-
longing that results in mutual links and support, and that motivates members to become
central agents in the improvement of their own reality’ (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2005).
Therefore, the objective of community action is to improve social well-being by promot-
ing active participation in actions designed to achieve it. Community action requires the
empowerment of citizens to drive change and improvements beyond their own individual
spheres.
In 2005, local health authorities in Barcelona (Agencia de Salut Publica de Barcelona
(ASPB)1 and Consorci Sanitari de Barcelona (CSB)), jointly with different actors from
the 10 districts of the city, started developing the community health program ‘Health
in the Neighborhoods’ in the city of Barcelona (Barcelona Salut als Barris, BSaB). The
program aimed to improve health outcomes and reduce inequality between the disadvan-
taged neighborhoods and the rest of the city. In the city of Barcelona, the program has
continued to develop uninterrupted since it began in 2008.2
BSaB is implemented through community-based interventions, and it targets areas
where income is below 90% of the city median. We should note that all potentially
participating areas were already benefiting from a previous location-based policy, the
‘Neighborhood Act’ (Llei de Barris, LDB, Generalitat de Catalunya 2004), which was
passed in the whole of the region of Catalonia to improve living conditions in the most
disadvantaged neighborhoods. However, and importantly for us, the LDB was a project
focused on improving infrastructure.3 Therefore, as the community component of the
LDB was not particularly strong and, to the extent that there was such a component, it
1All these initializations are from the original Catalan.
2The program has been kept running even though there have been changes in the party in power in
local government, both at the regional and city level. While in 2005 the center-left ‘Socialist Party’ was
in power both in the region of Catalonia (since 2003) and in the city of Barcelona (since 1979), it was
ousted by the center-right ‘Convergencia i Unio’ coalition in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Currently (since
2015), Barcelona City Council (Ajuntament de Barcelona) is run by Barcelona en Comu, a left-leaning
populist party. BSaB is still running.
3In all seven of the LDB funding programs, 143 of the 450 applications received from the whole
of Catalonia were granted finance. Up until 2014, just 8% of the LDB projects were carried out in
the city of Barcelona, sometimes grouping together several neighborhoods, all of them belonging to
disadvantaged areas. Examples of the improvements in infrastructure for public spaces and facilities can
be seen in Gonza´lez-Pampillo´n et al. (2017). As much as 80% of the funds were spent on public spaces
and facilities for public use, while an additional 10% was devoted to renovating the existing stock of
apartment buildings.
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was present in all potentially targeted neighborhoods, it will not cause any confounding
effects for our study.
Some analysis of BSaB has already been performed. While Dı´ez et al. (2012) describe
the experience, achievements, lessons, and challenges of the implementation of BSaB,
Sa´nchez-Ledesma et al. (2017) characterize the BSaB prioritization procedure. These
last authors state that the community perspective of health sensitizes and empowers the
community, encourages mutual support among its members and promotes their impor-
tance by making them responsible for the process of improving their own reality. Addi-
tionally, Barbieri et al. (2018) state the need to identify key indicators for measuring and
characterizing community action for health. Based on research into 49 neighborhoods in
Barcelona, Barbieri et al. (2018) devise an index to measure and characterize community
action for health, using different indicators. However, this literature on BSaB is mostly
related to descriptive analysis and written from a sociological point of view. Hence, causal
analysis of the policy has yet to be undertaken.
3.1 Description of the program
BSaB was deployed between 2008 and 2014 in 12 of the 49 neighborhoods potentially
participating, out of the 73 in the city of Barcelona. The 49 neighborhoods potentially
included were those in which average income was below 90% of the city median and where
some LDB activity was taking place. The 12 neighborhoods included in BSaB represented
around 15% of the city population and 25% of the potentially participating population4.
A key feature for our identification strategy is that the progressive rollout of BSaB in the
territory did not follow any specific pattern with regard to socioeconomic or demographic
characteristics, thereby allowing it to be regarded as a quasi-random experiment5. The
deployment and timing of BSaB are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1.
4See Table A1 in Appendix for population and income data of all 73 neighborhoods in Barcelona in
2007 and 2014.
5The quasi-random deployment of BSaB was confirmed by the public authorities running the program.
Importantly, they reported that crime levels were not considered when deciding BSaB implementation
and deployment. This is statistically assessed in later sections.
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Table 1: BSaB deployment by neighborhoods
Neighborhood Start Date First Priority
Roquetes Jun-2008 Mental Health
Poble Sec Jun-2008 Mental Health
St. Pere, Santa Caterina i la Ribera Jun-2009 Drugs
Torre Baro Jun-2009 Sexual Health
Ciutat Meridiana Jun-2009 Sexual Health
Vallbona Jun-2009 Sexual Health
Barceloneta Jul-2010 Drugs
Baro de Viver Mar-2011 Drugs
Bon Pastor Mar-2011 Drugs
Raval Oct-2011 Sexual Health
El Besos i el Maresme Oct-2013 Drugs
Verneda i La Pau Nov-2014 Mental Health
Source: Agencia de Salut Publica de Barcelona (ASPB).
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Figure 1: Deployment of BSaB interventions in the city of Barcelona.
Note: The colored neighborhoods are those that were potentially included in BSaB due to their income
characteristics. Those that in addition have hatching were those that actually participated.
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As explained in Dı´ez et al. (2012), in the implementation of BSaB, plurality, partici-
pation, sustainability, evidence and evaluation were applied in the following phases:
1. Establishment of political alliances and a steering group to facilitate interventions
(3 months’ time, pre-intervention).
2. Construct qualitative and quantitative community knowledge to list perceived prob-
lems (1 to 3 months’ time, pre-intervention).
3. Prioritization of problems and interventions by the local community and authorities
(1 day, pre-intervention).
4. Drawing up of an intervention plan for previously defined lines of action. Interven-
tion starts.
5. Evaluation of the implementation of the overall plan and of each intervention (1 to
3 years, post-intervention).
6. Maintenance of the working group on health, after the intensive phase (3 to 4 years,
post-intervention).
The interventions are intended to facilitate non-competitive physical activity, social
relationships, healthy recreation, health literacy, and sexual health. Some examples of
interventions are attention for young consumers of addictive substances (alcohol, tobacco,
marijuana), integration of the drug-dependent population, training and job placement,
sexual and reproductive health advice, parenting skills programs, mental healthcare, and
healthy leisure workshops (see Dı´ez et al. 2012; Generalitat de Catalunya 2014; Comis-
sionat de Salut 2016)6. Table 1 indicates which of these intervention fields were seen by
residents as priorities in each neighborhood. However, each neighborhood ended up with
a unique combination of interventions, making a heterogeneous analysis by intervention
type unfeasible.
For example, in Ciutat Meridiana, one of the activities was named ‘Alternative Fri-
days’. Targeted at adolescents aged 14-18, it aimed to provide healthy leisure activities.
In its first edition, over 200 individuals participated, of whom 73% were men and around
60% were foreigners. In satisfaction surveys, respondents were very satisfied and a quar-
ter of participants stated that the activities should be more frequent. Another example
is the ‘Syrian’ program at Bon Pastor. This was aimed at increasing knowledge and
awareness of contraception, reproductive health and the offer of public services available
in the neighborhood, especially for the immigrant population. The program reached 745
individuals and according to a survey of participants, satisfaction was very high (median
of 9/10).
Another important factor in the policy deployment is that these interventions were
mostly managed and run in each neighborhood by the local health center (CAP) alongside
6See Table A2 in the Appendix for a full list of activities run in the framework of BSaB.
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a community group that included representatives of civic entities and community associ-
ations, as well as social workers. There are almost 70 of these centers throughout the city
and most of them are related exclusively to a specific neighborhood.7 Because each CAP
has a certain area and population under its responsibility that is set by the administra-
tion, our identification strategy is even stronger as spillovers from one neighborhood to
another are highly unlikely.8 However, and very importantly for us, all of these interven-
tions were run from the beginning under a community perspective, involving the steering
group, the local community, and the authorities. In fact, it is this communal component
of BSaB that led us to hypothesize that BSaB boosted community ties and consequently
reduced local crime rates.
3.2 Potential mechanisms: the community component
Theoretically, the BSaB policy may affect criminal activity via different pathways. Ini-
tially, the most obvious may be the health channel, by which the improved health status
of the affected population may reduce criminal activity. Along these lines, Bondurant et
al. (2018) recently estimated the effects of expanding access to substance-abuse treatment
on local crime for US counties, and they indeed find that it reduces violent and financially
motivated crimes in a certain area, but not immediately.
However, due to the characteristics of BSaB that we have previously described, we
argue that improvements in health are not behind the effect that the policy may poten-
tially have on criminal activity. Instead, we claim that a mechanism of community ties is
operating. As previously mentioned, a body of research has documented the association
between community capital and becoming a victim of crime. The theoretical pathways
via which community capital leads to crime prevention include both formal and informal
mechanisms. For example, Sampson and Laub (1995) state that communities with strong
social capital are able to exert informal social control and also bolster the capacity to
obtain services from public agencies and formal institutions. In this particular policy, due
to the high degree of involvement that BSaB requires from neighbors, it is also expected
that closer links are built up within the neighborhood. As a result of this, informal social
control may also arise, increasing the probability of getting caught when committing a
crime, potentially leading to a fall in the crime rate in the area.
Several findings can help disentangle the potential mechanisms that lead to our results.
Firstly, we estimate the timing of the results in criminal activity. We claim that if the
response of the crime rate to the policy is relatively fast, it is harder to attribute the
reaction to improved health of the population. If health was actually the mechanism
7Every resident in Barcelona is assigned to a CAP according to their home address. In a sense, their
area of influence (called the Basic Health Area) can very much be seen as that of a school district in the
US. Basic Health Areas coincide to a large degree with neighborhoods.
8This was also confirmed by the authorities running the BSaB program.
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behind the effects of BSaB on crime, the results would take some time to materialize
(as in Bondurant et al. (2018)). Secondly, to definitely rule out the health channel, we
examined whether there have been any changes in the health status of participants and
non-participants. Consequently, if we observe a change in crime rates within a short
interval of time after policy implementation and if no effect is found on health, potential
impacts on crime will be due to the community feature of the policy and more robust
community ties.
4 Data and variables
The main data source for this project was a geocoded database of all recorded crime in
Catalonia from 2007 to 2014. These data were provided by the Catalan police authority
(Mossos d’Esquadra). It comprises all recorded crime with details of the exact time and
place of the crime as well as the type of crime at different levels of aggregation. In total
it contains for over 1.5 million entries. Such a large number of detailed observations in
our main dataset allows us to estimate our coefficients of interest at a relatively high time
frequency (such as a month) and a very low geographical level (such as a neighborhood)
while maintaining the robustness of the results unaltered.
Moreover, this data source provides information on the perpetrators who committed
the crimes, as well as on the victims, when available. The fact that we can estimate
figures for victims is of great value. This is not only true from an academic perspective,
where these types of figure are rarely available, but also in light of the policy under review.
As BSaB is aimed at specific populations through different interventions, it is possible to
evaluate whether the targeted groups are more or less likely to become victims of crime.
Additional data sources came from the Catalan Health Department (ICS) and from
the Public Policy and Government Institute (IGOP), a research group at the Universitat
Autonoma de Barcelona (UAB; Barbieri et al. 2018). These data sources provide in-
formation on the neighborhoods potentially targeted, those actually treated, the timing
of the policy in each neighborhood, prioritization of issues, and details of the activities
that formed part of each intervention. All this information allows us to understand our
setting in great detail, build our main explanatory variable (BSaB with exact timing
by neighborhood) and also, very importantly, to justify the quasi-random nature of the
public intervention.
What is more, we have at our disposal a remarkably rich set of socioeconomic vari-
ables that will act as controls for our main estimations. Most of them are available at the
neighborhood-month level, making such a dataset even more noteworthy. First of all, we
have information on the registered local associations (registration date and aims), which
allows us to understand the importance of the associational dynamism in the neighbor-
hood. This information was provided by the Catalan regional authorities (Generalitat de
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Catalunya). Moreover, and related to business cycles, we also have details of registered
unemployment rates,9 as well as housing market prices per square meter. Finally, we also
include a proxy for tourism pressure in per capita terms.10 This last variable accounts for
potential confounders resulting from the related economic activity, which is of great rele-
vance in a city highly exposed to such inflows, as Barcelona is. These last three variables
(registered unemployment, house prices, and tourism pressure) were built from informa-
tion provided by Barcelona City Hall (Ajuntament de Barcelona). While associations,
house prices and registered unemployment are considered at the neighborhood level, the
tourism pressure index is taken at the district level, as a neighborhood may be too small
of an influence area. A summary of the main variables of this analysis is shown in Table
A3 of the Appendix. Our final crime database is comprised of 4,704 observations, result-
ing from the product of the 12 months in 8 years (2007-2014) in the 49 neighborhoods
potentially included in Barcelona. For each observation (neighborhood-year-month) vic-
tim and crime rates per 1,000 inhabitants were determined, as well as the socioeconomic
variables previously mentioned. However, by adding the full set of controls, the number
of observations was reduced to 3,528. This was due to the fact that housing prices and
registered unemployment rates have only been available since 2009.
4.1 Creating crime typologies
As previously stated, the database provided by the Catalan police is very rich in many
aspects, one of which is the way crime is codified. There are over 300 classes of crime
recorded, which cover more than 190 articles of the Spanish Penal Code. Even though
having such a large amount of information is of great value for our research, this cod-
ification is not functional for our analysis. Therefore, based on those 300 classes, we
constructed 17 detailed crime categories, which we also group into 3 broad categories.
Both categorizations cover the entire range of recorded crime types.11
However, considering our setting, we understand that further and more specific crime
categories should be designed. To this end, we came up with two new broad crime
categories that are transverse to those previously defined. First, we created a broad
category we named ‘intimate crimes’, which covers the detailed categories of family, sexual
and gender violence. The rationale behind this aggregation is that it summarizes all the
crimes related to very close personal relationships. Secondly, following the description
by Currie and Almond (2011), we defined a broad category we named ‘anger crimes’
that includes the detailed categories of criminal damages, bodily harm, disobedience,
9According to the National Statistics Institute (INE), 76% of all unemployed individuals appear in
the unemployment register.
10We consider the number of tickets sold daily in every public museum in the city. This proxy is highly
correlated (0.69) with the total number of tickets sold in every tourist outlet point in the city.
11Details of crime classifications are presented in Table A4 of the Appendix.
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and threatening behavior. These are crimes that are not motivated by money or close
emotional links, but still have some behavioral or personal component.12 Except for
criminal damage to property, all the other categories correspond to crimes against the
person. We understand that criminal damage to property still needs to be included in
such a category as it may be a result of anger, irritation or rage. In this regard, the
richness of the data allows us to depart from traditionally set crime typologies (that may
be too broad or misleading), and analyze new ones that focus on exactly the types of
crime we believe the BSaB policy may affect via the community channel. Hence, this
helps to pinpoint the causal effects of community ties on crime rates better.13
This classification indicates that intimate and anger crimes account for almost 1 out
of every 5 crimes recorded, and that anger crimes are much more frequent than intimate
crimes. Even though at first it may seem that these do not represent an important part of
overall crime, we must consider that they inflict a much higher ‘disutility’ on their victims
than other more frequent types of crime. Indeed, Dolan et al. (2005) indicate that while
discounted QALY14 losses resulting from rapes and sexual assaults are 0.561 and 0.160,
from a common assault this figure is just 0.007. This demonstrates the importance of
dealing with such offenses.
Table 2: Crime distribution by typology and location
% Crime % Residence % Street % Other
All crime 100 10 45 46
Intimate 3.0 62 25 13
Family 0.7 68 19 13
Gender 2.0 64 26 10
Sexual 0.3 36 31 32
Anger 15.9 21 45 35
Criminal damages 8.5 21 41 38
Bodily harm 3.0 11 52 38
Disobedience 1.8 8 67 25
Threatening behavior 2.5 43 31 26
Drugs 0.7 3 87 10
Source: Our own, constructed from Catalan Police data.
Additionally, Table 2 shows how crime types are distributed by location. From this
table, it is clear that there are some typologies with location patterns that are particularly
attached to an address. These are indeed those which we already included in the intimate
crime category. Also, some others, such as threatening behavior (included in the anger
12Currie and Almond (2011) state that temperamental skills are often not mentioned directly in the
literature but are proxied by psychological traits, social skills, and behavioral issues.
13Details of these two new categories are presented in Table A5 of the Appendix.
14Quality-adjusted life years.
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broad category), also present a high share of being committed at a residence. Because of
this location pattern, and its relevance in light of the characteristics of the BSaB policy,
our analysis will mainly focus on intimate and anger crimes. We will also pay particular
attention to drug offenses, as they are closely related to the initiatives carried out as part
of BSaB.
Tables A5 to A8 in the Appendix show summary statistics for our dependent variables
and controls. Results are shown both for the entire city of Barcelona (all 73 neighbor-
hoods) and for the area potentially included in BSaB (49 neighborhoods).
5 Empirical Strategy
In order to evaluate the impact of BSaB on local crime rates, we adopted a stag-
gered differences-in-differences approach (sDiD), where our observational unit was a
neighborhood-month pair. The ‘staggered’ term comes from the fact that treatment was
implemented over a different period of time for the different observational units. This
method quantifies the impact of a given program (in this case, BSaB) as the difference of
outcome changes (post- vs. pre-intervention) between participants and non-participants.
In this case, and in order to have comparable treatment and control units, the spatial
units of analysis were the neighborhoods in Barcelona where some LDB activity was tak-
ing place and whose income was below 90% of the city median (those colored blue in
the previous maps; the white areas do not form part of our analysis). We quantified the
impact of the BSaB policy as the difference in crime before and after the implementation
of BSaB for neighborhoods where BSaB took place (blue and with hatching in Figure 1)
and those where it did not (blue but without hatching in Figure 1).
sDiD = E[Crime(after)− Crime(before)|BSaB = 1]
−E[Crime(after)− Crime(before)|BSaB = 0]
(1)
Since the implementation of BSaB was staggered across neighborhoods, the before and
after periods are not always the same, but rather differ across treatment observations.
It should be noted that the artificial nature of the geographical boundaries may in-
troduce the problem of potentially capturing spillover effects across neighborhoods. This
problem is a general concern in the urban economics literature when dealing with geo-
graphically small treatment and control units. In order to address this issue, researchers
can either choose some types of crime that follow a more geographically concentrated pat-
tern (such as Warner and Rountree 1997) or construct a unique exposure to the treatment
measure (as in Takagi et al. (2012), where a weighting matrix assigned each unit a level
of ‘exposure’ to treatment). In our current analysis, we followed the approach taken in
Warner and Rountree (1997), and focused on types of crime with a clear location pattern,
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such as those that mostly take place in residences, which above all are those we classify as
intimate crimes. Additionally, due to the nature of the policy under evaluation, we also
considered as a result, drug-related and anger crimes. It was possible to implement this
strategy due to the finely detailed data we had that allowed us to overcome this problem.
Restricting the study in such a way dispelled potential spillover concerns.
Taking the previous points into consideration, our first set of estimations directly tests
the impact of BSaB on criminal activity as follows:
Crimeit = α + β1Tit + β2BSaBi + β3(Tit.BSaBi) + θXit + γt + δi + εit (2)
where the dependent variable is the victim/crime rate per 1,000 inhabitants, i is the
neighborhood, t is the time period, BSaBi = 1 for participants, Tit = 1 for the post-
treatment period (different for each treatment unit), γt and δi are time and space fixed
effects, Xit is a vector of socioeconomic controls (including local associations, housing
prices, registered unemployment, tourism pressure) and εit is the error term. In the case of
victims, we considered as dependent variables specific victim rates per 1,000 individuals,
considering the characteristics of the victims in terms of gender, age and nationality. In
the case of crime rates, we considered the overall crime rate, and the specific crime types,
such as intimate and anger. In all cases, the sDiD estimator of the policy effect is given
by β3.
In addition, we wanted to analyze the differential effect of the policy depending on
new local associations in the neighborhood. This would relate to the idea that community
ties is a motivational force driving the effect that BSaB has on criminal activity. To test
this hypothesis, we use the following equation:
Crimeit = α + β1Tit + β2BSaBi + β3(Tit.BSaBi)
+β4(Tit.BSaBi.Associt) + θXit + γt + δi + εit
(3)
Furthermore, responses over time were also studied by applying the following equation:
Crimeit = α + β1Tit + β2BSaBi +Bτ (Tit.BSaBi) + θXit + γt + δi + εit (4)
Note that in this case, we have a set of policy effect estimates (Bτ , τ=1...M) that precisely
indicate the policy effect for each month after policy implementation. First of all, this
allows us to determine the speed at which the policy affects the different crime rates (if at
all), therefore potentially leading to heterogeneous results among typologies. However,
also importantly, as previously explained, this estimation helps us to disentangle the
potential mechanisms behind the results.
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6 Results
Firstly, in order to tackle possible endogeneity issues of treatment status, in Tables 3 and
4 we present a set of t-tests performed on differences between treatment and control units,
previous to the intervention (in 2007). These indicate that there were no significant dif-
ferences between treatment and non-treatment units in a set of observable socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics. Regarding crime rates, differences appear at the level
of broad crime categories, but not in their growth rates. Nonetheless, for drug crimes,
differences were found, hence the results will have to be interpreted with caution.
Table 3: T-tests on pre-existing observable characteristics
Variable p-value Variable p-value
Population 0.874 Teenage population 0.880
Men 0.932 Women 0.682
Spanish households 0.357 Non-Spanish households 0.153
Fecundity 0.062 Mortality rate 0.457
House prices 0.597 Vehicles 0.287
Associations 0.217 Tourism 0.134
Pensions 0.200
Source: Our own, constructed from Barcelona City Hall data.
Table 4: T-test on pre-existing crime rates
Crime type p-value Crime type p-value
rate growth rate growth
All crime 0.001 0.702 Criminal damage to property 0.918 0.192
Property 0.002 0.525 Drugs 0.026 0.000
Person 0.003 0.103 Family 0.688 0.386
Intimate 0.000 0.276 Gender 0.000 0.125
anger 0.275 0.592 Bodily harm 0.159 0.883
Disobedience 0.090 0.384
Threatening behavior 0.079 0.924
Source: Our own, constructed from Catalan Police data
Furthermore, we estimated a logit model where the dependent variable was the treat-
ment indicator; as well as a panel logit, where the timing of the treatment was considered.
The results (in Tables A9 and A10 of the Appendix) show that our explanatory variables
do not seem to explain either the fact of being included in the intervention or its timing.
These results represent a solid case in favor of the quasi-random assignment of the
policy in the targeted area15, or at least of the parallel trends assumption. Now that we
have shown this, we proceed to the analysis of our main estimations.
15Such a feature was later confirmed informally by anecdotal evidence provided by the authorities
running BSaB in the Barcelona Public Health Agency (ASPB). At informal meetings we learned that
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6.1 Baseline results
Table 5 presents results based on the estimation of Eq.(2) for victim and crime rates, clus-
tering standard errors at the neighborhood level (Cameron and Miller 2015). Accordingly,
when it comes to becoming a victim of crime, the dependent variable is measured as the
specific victim offense rate per 1,000 inhabitants of a certain group.
Overall, the results for the estimated impact of new motivators driving local commu-
nity ties, such as BSaB, on local crime rates are mixed. Our results indicate that once
we control for pre-existing social fabric, business cycle variables and tourism pressure,
the policy itself shows no significant impact on victim rates by gender16. However, we
can state that BSaB did have a direct negative impact on anger crime rates. Our results
indicate that the BSaB intervention in a neighborhood reduced anger crime rates by
0.13, which roughly translates to an important average decrease of 9%. When analyzing
its components, we conclude that the anger crime figures are mostly driven by criminal
damages, which drops by 18%. Regarding intimate crime rates, we obtained less robust
results17. Nonetheless, the results indicate that BSaB reduces intimate crime rates by
0.045, which implies a striking decrease of 18%. For this category, the results are mainly
derived from gender crimes18. In these cases, it must be noted that crime rates are much
lower than for other criminal typologies, making percentage decreases of higher magni-
tude. These less significant results may be linked to the fact that these crime categories
represent a very small share of overall crime, thus leading to less robust results. Regard-
ing drug crimes, which represent another important result considering the policy under
study, we also found no direct effect of BSaB.
Therefore, even if we do not see a decrease in criminal activity across all its different
aspects studied after the policy implementation, we do see important reductions in as-
pects of key relevance in light of BSaB. Moreover, it must be noted that our preferred
specification, that in column 6, is very stringent and hence quite demanding for our es-
timates. Therefore, the results that still hold when such a set of controls is added are
indeed quite solid.
the assignment of neighborhoods to the intervention did not follow any rule-based procedure and it was
rather an arbitrary decision.
16Results for offenders, which are available upon request, were not statistically significant.
17Results for intimate crimes are significant at 13%.
18No significant effect of BSaB is found for sexual crime rates; while for gender and family crimes, the
results were significant at 11%.
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Table 5: Differences-in-Differences estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Victims
Male 4.747* 2.308** 2.315** 0.552 0.707 0.426
(2.759) (1.009) (1.008) (0.529) (0.534) (0.402)
R-squared 0.023 0.803 0.804 0.775 0.775 0.802
Female 6.379** 1.707 1.712 1.199 1.329 1.088
(3.007) (1.385) (1.385) (1.359) (1.328) (1.288)
R-squared 0.079 0.758 0.758 0.764 0.765 0.787
Observations 4,702 4,702 4,702 3,087 3,087 3,087
Panel B: Crime types
Intimate 0.073** -0.074 -0.074 -0.042 -0.042 -0.045
(0.029) (0.045) (0.045) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030)
R-squared 0.007 0.209 0.210 0.265 0.266 0.293
Observations 4,704 4,704 4,704 2,999 2,999 2,999
Anger 0.422 0.123 0.124 -0.123 -0.097 -0.129**
(0.368) (0.179) (0.179) (0.073) (0.081) (0.057)
R-squared 0.004 0.791 0.791 0.806 0.806 0.819
Observations 4,704 4,704 4,704 3,087 3,087 3,087
Drugs 0.055 0.013 0.013 -0.000 0.004 0.008
(0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.055) (0.049) (0.048)
R-squared 0.011 0.315 0.315 0.513 0.515 0.531
Observations 4,704 4,704 4,704 3,087 3,087 3,087
Neighborhood FE x x x x x
Time FE x x x x x
New Associations x x x x
Housing prices x x x
Registered unemployment x x
Tourism x
Note: Time fixed effects include year and month FE. Neighborhood-clustered standard errors are in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
6.2 Role of Local Associations
Next, in Table 6 we present results based on the estimation of Eq.(3) for victim and
crime rates. For these estimates, we incorporate an interaction term between the policy
indicator and the new registered local associations. This reflects both the theoretical and
anecdotal evidence, that such entities may play an important role in the effectiveness of
the policy19.
19This was also suggested by the IGOP research group when making a sociological evaluation of
BSaB, as indicated in informal conversations with the researchers; despite this finding not appearing in
any formal written document.
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For these estimates, we did find a significant and negative coefficient for the effect of
the interaction term on victim rates, both for men and women. However, joint significance
tests indicate that the overall results are only significant for female victims. Regarding
the age profile of the victims, we found significant results for all the age groups of women
considered, but only on the extremes of the age distribution for men20. When analyzing
which types of crime are more prominent according to victim characteristics, we clearly
observed that women are considerably more exposed to becoming victims of intimate
crimes; whereas for men, anger crimes are more frequent21. Indeed, while for the entire
sample only 4.8% were victims of intimate crime, this value increases to 7.9% when only
women are considered. This is due to the victim rate of gender violence, which is also
more prominent among victims aged 25-45. On the issue of male victims, anger crimes
represent a higher share of all crimes perpetrated against them. In this case, both criminal
damages and bodily harm are more important than for the overall average22.
Finally, concerning the matter of crime typologies, for intimate and anger crimes, the
inclusion of the interaction term in our estimations did not add any new interpretation
to the baseline results, as only a direct impact of BSaB was found to be significant. For
the case of drugs, even if we did find a negative and statistically significant impact of
the interaction term, the joint significance test showed that this no longer holds when
considering both coefficients. Lastly, and in order to confirm that the policy did not have
any impact on financially motivated crimes, we present results for auto theft for which,
as expected, no significant results were found.
20Results available upon request.
21See Table A11 of the Appendix for further details.
22Regarding offenders, the results are less robust and no statistically significant impact was found
for males or females. A significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term was found for young
offenders under 18, but the joint significance tests did not reject the possibility of both coefficients being
equal to zero. In this regard, even if we do not have formal proof, we believe this may be due to the fact
that offenders are more mobile than victims; hence, it may be more difficult to recognize the effects of
BSaB on them. Further studies should be carried out to examine this issue.
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Table 6: Extended Differences-in-Differences
Victims Crime types
Male Female Intimate Anger Drugs Auto theft
BSaB 0.893* 2.046 -0.043 -0.136** 0.038 -0.082
(0.477) (1.326) (0.028) (0.057) (0.042) (0.133)
Assoc 0.049 0.142* 0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.010
(0.044) (0.080) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.008)
Assoc x BSaB -0.397* -0.814** -0.002 0.006 -0.026* -0.006
(0.225) (0.343) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018)
R-squared 0.802 0.790 0.293 0.819 0.538 0.758
Observations 3,087 3,087 2,999 3,087 3,087 3,087
Joint Sign. 0.155 0.070 0.310 0.062 0.206 0.681
Neigh FE x x x x x x
Time FE x x x x x x
Housing prices x x x x x x
Unemployment x x x x x x
Tourism x x x x x x
Neighborhood-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results related to local associations indicate that BSaB only has an impact on
female victim rates when jointly considered with the dynamic social fabric in the neigh-
borhood. One way (the straightforward one) to understand such an implication is that
BSaB would not work without the local associations. This would imply that if a particular
neighborhood was assigned to the BSaB program but then local associations showed no
dynamism, then the BSaB policy would not have any impact whatsoever on victim rates.
However, a second way to interpret these results is to see BSaB as an factor that links
associations to each other. According to this interpretation, the treatment and control
units could then be seen as contexts in which associations become coordinated among
each other (treatment), or remain individualized and isolated associations working on
their own (controls). The treatment effect could then be given by the synergies caused
by this linkage between local associations. Regardless of which of the interpretations is
followed, the evidence supports the vision that the links formed in the neighborhood are
indeed of key relevance for the success of a community-based policy such as BSaB. Hence,
whenever a similar type of intervention is designed, this aspect of the neighborhood or
area of intervention must be considered.
Additionally, our findings are of great value in light of the policy itself, as women
victims are those who benefit most from it. This is extremely relevant for two reasons.
Firstly, this is because many interventions were aimed at empowering women and raising
awareness of sexual health and education. Even though most of the actions targeted
younger population groups, there were also activities for middle-aged women. Secondly,
it is because our findings indicate that progress was achieved on such an important issue
as violence against women. Indeed, according to national statistics, in 2018 there were
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over 30 thousand cases registered as gender violence in Spain.
Moreover, our results are in line with those of previous studies; while in many ways
they represent improvements on some of the approaches previously adopted. For instance,
Takagi et al. (2012) had already established that support networks and social capital are
inversely associated with crime. However, crime was only measured for any kind of victim,
making the analysis too broad and general. Moreover, Warner and Rountree (1997) also
found that social ties significantly decrease crime. However, those results were again
relatively limited, as a significant link was only found for assault rates in predominantly
white neighborhoods. Our results are also related to those of Buonanno et al. (2009) and
Lederman et al. (2002), although our findings differ from those. For example, Buonanno
et al. (2009) do not find a clear effect of social capital on crime, but their dependent
variable is property crime, proxied by auto theft. We did not find a significant effect
on auto theft either. Moreover, Lederman et al. (2002) state that trust (seen as social
capital) has a significant and robust effect on violent crime, proxied by homicide rates.
6.3 Event study results
In this subsection, we present estimations from Eq.(4), where we introduce effects over
the time of the policy on local crime rates. This exercise indicates whether the effect of
BSaB on local crime rates is relatively fast or alternatively, if it takes some time to have
an actual impact on our variables of interest. This dynamic estimation was undertaken
for intimate and anger crime rates. The results are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2: Dynamic estimation of rates of intimate crimes. 95% Confidence intervals.
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Figure 3: Dynamic estimation of rates of anger crimes. 95% Confidence intervals.
As the figures show, the impact of BSaB is different over time for rates of intimate
and anger crimes. Figure 2 indicates that the effect of BSaB on intimate crime rates
occurs in the very short run. Thus, the impact is quite immediate, showing a significant
decrease just 2 months after policy implementation. However, Figure 2 also shows that
the impact is quite ephemeral, as by month 6, the effect had already become diluted. A
very different picture is found for anger crime rates. In this case, BSaB takes longer to
affect local crime rates and is only significant 10 months after implementation. However,
the effect persists longer over time. It is also important to note that the pre-treatment
coefficients are not statistically different from zero in both cases.
6.4 Robustness checks
Table 7 presents several robustness checks for anger and intimate crimes. In all cases we
found that the coefficient estimated for BSaB remained quite stable when using different
sets of controls (columns 2 to 5). This result demonstrates the robustness of the previ-
ously results. The exception is column 2, where we consider only neighborhood tourism,
instead of at the district level, and the coefficient is no longer significant for anger crime
rates. However, such a definition of tourism may be too restrictive, especially in small
neighborhoods like those in the historic central district of the city, which in our case are
used as treatment units. Moreover, and very importantly, our falsification exercise (col-
umn 6), which assigns random treatment in terms of neighborhoods and roll-out, reflects
no significant results.
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Table 7: Robustness to alternative specifications
Baseline Robustness checks Falsification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Anger
BSaB -0.136** -0.106 -0.158*** -0.130** -0.132** 0.007
(0.057) (0.078) (0.055) (0.057) (0.059) (0.022)
Assoc -0.002 -0.004 -535.687 -0.009 -0.011 -0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (556.385) (0.139) (0.012) (0.009)
BSaB x Assoc 0.006 0.007 745.176 -0.109 0.004 0.003
(0.011) (0.0012) (542.951) (0.150) (0.018) (0.010)
Intimate
BSaB -0.043 -0.037 -0.054* -0.045 -0.044 0.000
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.005)
Assoc 0.005 0.005 15.360 0.041 0.006* 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (80.496) (0.053) (0.004) (0.003)
BSaB x Assoc -0.002 -0.004 206.536 0.024 -0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (186.869) (0.052) (0.006) (0.003)
Note: Column 1 presents our main estimates from the previous section. In column 2, we change our
tourism proxy, considering neighborhood ticket sales instead of district ticket sales. In column 3, we
change the measure of existing community capital by considering per capita associations in the neigh-
borhood instead of all associations. In columns 4 and 5, we also change the measure of associations by
taking only a subset of them: in column 4, we consider only those which declared themselves to have an
objective of providing assistance; and in column 5, we consider those categorized as cultural. Finally, in
column 6, we present a falsification exercise of the BSaB policy. Year, month and neighborhood fixed
effects are included. Neighborhood-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Additionally, we present results from the Safety and Victim Survey for Catalonia
2007-2014. In the Survey, individuals were questioned regarding items such as safety and
civility in their neighborhood and district, as well as being asked about their experiences
of being a victim of crime in the past 12 months. Specifically, individuals were asked
whether they feel safety and civility have improved, worsened or stayed the same in their
neighborhood in comparison to the previous year. We use this question by running a
logistic regression on safety and civility having improved against the presence of BSaB in
the neighborhood in that year. Estimates are presented in Table 8 and show significant
results for safety. Indeed, the presence of BSaB raised the probability of perceiving an
improvement in safety by approximately 3%. From this result, we surmise that even
if local crime rates do not drop for all the categories analyzed, individuals living in the
participating neighborhoods at least feel that safety has improved. However, no significant
results were found for perceptions of civility. We believe that the fact that civility is less
specific than safety may influence these results: it could be that each respondent has
a different concept of civility (as broadly specified in the survey) and it may be more
difficult to perceive.
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Table 8: Average marginal effect of BSaB on perceptions of safety and civility
Increased civility Increased safety
BSaB -0.007 0.032***
(0.007) (0.008)
Observations 21,779 21,779
Wald Chi2 225.98 160.90
FE Y Y
Note: Average marginal effect from logistic regression of improvement in safety and civility on imple-
mentation of BSaB with district and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Finally, and in order to completely rule out health as a mechanism, we also conducted a
brief analysis of those results. To do so, we relied on microdata from the Barcelona Health
Survey (Encuesta de Salud de Barcelona, ESB) for the 2001-2016 period. Specifically,
we made use of the ‘health status’ question, which is based on self-perception. Answers
range from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). We then compared the answers of individuals
in treatment and control neighborhoods in 2006 (just before BSaB) and in 2016 (after
BSaB). The results (Figure 4) show firstly a worsening of health perception, and secondly
no statistically significant differences in the means between individuals in treatment and
control neighborhoods before and after BSaB implementation. Moreover, and in line
with these results, Pale`ncia et al. (2018) find no evolution of self-rated health for men
and women in treatment and control neighborhoods.
Figure 4: ESB mean answers by treatment status. 95% Confidence intervals.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the effect of increasing community capital on local crime rates,
taking advantage of the quasi-random nature of a community health policy rolled out in
the city of Barcelona from 2008 to 2014 (BSaB). The policy was implemented in 12 of
the 49 potential neighborhoods and covered around a quarter of the targeted population.
Even though the aim of the policy itself was to improve health outcomes in these un-
derprivileged neighborhoods, we argue that the ‘community’ feature of BSaB led to an
increase in community capital, and consequently to a reduction in crime rates. Using a
staggered DiD approach, we find that this is indeed the case: female victim rates drop in
participating neighborhoods, while anger crimes fell by 9%. We find less robust results
for intimate crimes. Due to the dynamic analysis of criminal activity and the lack of an
effect on self-rated health across treatment and control neighborhoods, we rule out health
as the channel via which these s occur, and argue that the strengthening of community
ties is the key mechanism.
As already mentioned, despite crime not being one of the specific targets of the policy
itself, it is clearly indirectly linked to them, as crime rates reflect local disparities. Hence,
we understand that the policy was successful in achieving one of its goals. However,
we further understand that there is more to be done to improve the effectiveness of the
program, as some key crime categories for the policy (such as drugs) were not affected
by the program. In light of the results of the interaction term, new initiatives should be
carried on, especially in cooperation with existing local institutions.
Moreover, this paper provides clear evidence that not only traditional policies against
crime are effective. On the contrary, new and less disruptive means of reducing criminal
activity in disadvantaged neighborhoods can be effective. Even if constructing community
ties is more challenging than increasing traditional policing or patrolling, this type of
innovative (alternative) policies may work better in several contexts. Takagi et al. (2012)
argue that policy-makers should not neglect policies aimed at reducing inequalities as
a means to promote social cohesion, social stability, and safer neighborhoods. A better
understanding of the interactions between social cohesion and public policy is essential
if we are to reduce criminal activity induced by the lack of integration of some citizens
facing substandard social and economic conditions.
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Appendix
Neighborhood and BSaB characteristics
Table A1: Neighborhood characteristics: population and rent
District Neighborhood Pop 07 Pop 14 Rent 07 Rent 14 Low Inc. Treatment
0 0 Barcelona City 1.603.178 1.613.393 100 100 NA NA
1 1 el Raval 46.595 48.471 64,7 65,9 Y Y
1 2 el Barri Gotic 27.946 15.911 86,5 98,5 N N
1 3 la Barceloneta 15.921 15.181 66,7 84,5 Y Y
1 4 Sant Pere, Santa Caterina i la Ribera 22.572 22.674 80,2 92,5 Y Y
2 5 el Fort Pienc 31.521 31.785 107,9 104,5 N N
2 6 la Sagrada Famlia 52.185 51.562 101,8 92,4 N N
2 7 la Dreta de l’Eixample 42.504 43.749 137,6 165,3 N N
2 8 l’Antiga Esquerra de l’Eixample 41.413 41.975 126,5 127,8 N N
2 9 la Nova Esquerra de l’Eixample 58.146 57.863 116,9 109,1 N N
2 10 Sant Antoni 37.988 38.369 103,8 97,8 N N
3 11 el Poble Sec - Parc Montjuic 39.579 40.674 73,3 66,3 Y Y
3 12 la Marina del Prat Vermell - Zona Franca 1.005 1.151 80,4 39,4 Y N
3 13 la Marina de Port 29.327 30.286 80,2 72,0 Y N
3 14 la Font de la Guatlla 10.064 10.406 90,4 77,6 Y N
3 15 Hostafrancs 15.771 15.919 82,7 76,8 Y N
3 16 la Bordeta 18.592 18.451 81,9 76,0 Y N
3 17 Sants - Badal 24.085 24.245 85,9 79,6 Y N
3 18 Sants 40.272 41.102 89,5 85,8 Y N
4 19 les Corts 46.400 46.205 130,4 125,4 N N
4 20 la Maternitat i Sant Ramon 23.938 23.735 127,9 112,6 N N
4 21 Pedralbes 11.413 11.670 193,6 251,7 N N
5 22 Vallvidrera, el Tibidabo i les Planes 4.038 4.615 146,4 162,8 N N
5 23 Sarria 23.316 24.691 174,9 195,2 N N
5 24 les Tres Torres 15.325 16.381 215,3 217,8 N N
5 25 Sant Gervasi - la Bonanova 23.634 25.378 182,2 191,8 N N
5 26 Sant Gervasi - Galvany 46.454 46.648 187,0 192,1 N N
5 27 el Putxet i el Farro 28.990 29.041 150,2 140,2 N N
6 28 Vallcarca i els Penitents 15.381 15.454 113,2 101,6 N N
6 29 el Coll 7.190 7.307 91,7 81,6 Y N
6 30 la Salut 13.072 13.256 113,0 107,3 N N
6 31 la Vila de Gracia 50.409 50.680 101,9 118,1 N N
6 32 el Camp d’en Grassot i Gracia Nova 34.535 34.146 104,3 103,7 N N
7 33 el Baix Guinardo 25.816 25.587 96,6 86,6 Y N
7 34 Can Baro 8.998 8.887 81,2 77,4 Y N
7 35 el Guinardo 35.038 35.698 93,0 82,0 Y N
7 36 la Font d’en Fargues 9.621 9.467 103,5 102,0 N N
7 37 el Carmel 32.745 31.728 72,0 56,6 Y N
7 38 la Teixonera 11.332 11.379 72,2 69,6 Y N
7 39 Sant Genis dels Agudells 7.069 6.865 85,7 80,0 Y N
7 40 Montbau 5.105 5.082 85,5 70,0 Y N
7 41 la Vall d’Hebron 5.476 5.422 96,5 86,9 Y N
7 42 la Clota 445 529 89,9 90,1 Y N
7 43 Horta 26.638 26.591 85,9 82,2 Y N
8 44 Vilapicina i la Torre Llobeta 25.672 25.500 83,0 64,0 Y N
8 45 Porta 23.470 24.424 75,3 58,3 Y N
8 46 el Turo de la Peira 15.102 15.471 65,4 50,6 Y N
8 47 Can Peguera 2.143 2.288 49,8 51,0 Y N
8 48 la Guineueta 15.394 15.090 82,0 56,0 Y N
8 49 Canyelles 7.539 7.014 76,7 61,0 Y N
8 50 les Roquetes 15.756 15.668 60,9 50,8 Y Y
8 51 Verdun 12.301 12.239 63,8 50,8 Y N
8 52 la Prosperitat 26.696 26.171 72,6 53,7 Y N
8 53 la Trinitat Nova 8.011 7.462 53,0 34,7 Y N
8 54 Torre Baro 2.105 2.682 58,0 45,6 Y Y
8 55 Ciutat Meridiana 10.929 10.356 59,4 39,2 Y Y
8 56 Vallbona 1.267 1.353 51,6 39,9 Y Y
9 57 la Trinitat Vella 9.992 10.268 74,8 45,9 Y N
9 58 Baro de Viver 2.397 2.508 44,5 60,5 Y Y
9 59 el Bon Pastor 12.332 12.758 66,2 59,6 Y Y
9 60 Sant Andreu 55.171 56.496 85,9 76,6 Y N
9 61 la Sagrera 28.469 28.914 88,1 74,9 Y N
9 62 el Congres i els Indians 13.896 14.076 86,5 72,7 Y N
9 63 Navas 21.454 21.949 92,9 83,3 Y N
10 64 el Camp de l’Arpa del Clot 38.604 38.130 93,4 80,9 Y N
10 65 el Clot 26.796 27.082 88,5 81,0 Y N
10 66 el Parc i la Llacuna del Poblenou 13.104 14.814 103,2 88,6 N N
10 67 la Vila Olimpica del Poblenou 8.783 9.391 132,8 150,8 N N
10 68 el Poblenou 30.181 33.425 94,5 95,4 Y N
10 69 Diagonal Mar i el Front Martim del Poblenou 9.775 13.351 101,1 168,8 N N
10 70 el Besos i el Maresme 22.652 23.191 61,7 58,9 Y Y
10 71 Provenals del Poblenou 18.731 20.184 85,7 91,7 Y N
10 72 Sant Marti de Provenals 26.261 26.018 81,5 67,6 Y N
10 73 la Verneda i la Pau 29.452 28.903 74,8 57,2 Y Y
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Table A2: BSaB activities by scope
Intervention Target population Neighborhoods
Early Childhood and Family
Healthy leisure in sports Primary-school students Poble Sec
Healthy leisure in sports Middle-school students Roquetes, Bon Pastor, Baro de Viver
parenting skills programs Parents of children aged
3-5
El Born, Torre Baro, Ciutat Meridiana, Vall-
bona, Barceloneta
Healthy cooking workshops Parents of children aged
3-17
Poble Sec
Support for extracurricular ac-
tivities
Primary-school families Roquetes, Barceloneta
Adolescents and young adults
Healthy leisure in sports High-school Students Roquetes, Poble Sec, El Born, Torre Baro, Ciu-
tat Meridiana,Vallbona
Healthy leisure at night Those aged 14-18 Torre Baro, Ciutat Meridiana, Vallbona
Sexual health and counseling Those aged 14-25 Torre Baro, Ciutat Meridiana, Vallbona, Raval
Sex education on contraception Under 20s Torre Baro, Ciutat Meridiana, Vallbona, Bon
Pastor, Baro de Viver
Drug Counseling Under 21s Roquetes, Poble Sec, Raval
Drugs, violence, and endogamic
groups
15-29 year-olds at
psycho-social risk
Bon Pastor, Baro de Viver, Raval
Improving self-esteem, empow-
erment and integration
Pakistani women aged
14-21
El Besos i el Maresme
Adults
Sex education for adults Women aged 20-50 Torre Baro, Ciutat Meridiana, Vallbona, Bon
Pastor, Baro de Viver
Tai chi in the park 40 and above Roquetes, Poble Sec, El Born, Torre Baro, Ciu-
tat Meridiana, Vallbona, Bon Pastor, Baro de
Viver, El Besos i el Maresme
Obesity, sedentary lifestyle,
stress, anxiety, depression
Adults and the elderly Bon Pastor, Baro de Viver
Elderly
Memory Groups The elderly Roquetes
Help to take a walk around the
neighborhood
The elderly Poble Sec, El Born, Torre Baro, Ciutat Meridi-
ana, Vallbona, El Besos i el Maresme
How to be healthy The elderly El Born, Bon Pastor, Baro de Viver, El Besos i
el Maresme
All interested parties
Alcohol abuse Everyone Barceloneta
Tobacco addiction All smokers Roquetes, Poble Sec
Home-made remedies Everyone Roquetes
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Data description
Table A3: Description of main variables
Variable Description Source Frequency availability
Crime counts Registered criminal acts Catalan police Geocoded; Exact time
Offender counts Registered offenders Catalan police Geocoded; Exact time
Victim counts Registered victims Catalan police Geocoded; Exact time
Population Registered inhabitants Barcelona City Hall Neighborhood; Year
Crime rate Crime counts per 1,000 inhabitants Police and City Hall Neighborhood; Month
Victim rate Victim counts per 1,000 inhabitants Police and City Hall Neighborhood; Month
Associations Newly registered local associations Catalan regional au-
thorities
Neighborhood; Month
House prices House market prices per square meter Barcelona City Hall Neighborhood; Month
Unemployment Registered unemployment rate Barcelona City Hall Neighborhood; Month
Tourism Per capita visitors to neighborhood
tourist sites
Barcelona City Hall Neighborhood;Month
Note: Crime rates are compiled monthly despite using the annual population.
Table A4: Broad and detailed crime categories
Broad Share Detailed Share
Against Person 8.9 Family 0.7
Gender violence 2.0
Bodily harm 3.0
Murder 0.1
Sexual 0.3
Threatening behavior 2.5
Other 0.3
Against Property 86.6 Criminal damage to property 8.5
Fraud 5.2
Auto theft 11.4
Robbery 14.5
Theft 47.1
Other 4.5 Arson 0.0
Drugs 0.7
Environment 0.2
Disobedience 1.8
Road safety 1.8
Total 1 1
Source: Our own, constructed from Catalan Police data
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Table A5: Descriptive statistics, crime rates per 1,000 inhabitants. 2007-2014
All Neighborhoods Potentially participating
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
All 10.235 15.790 8.758 13.088
Person 0.735 0.882 0.759 0.987
Property 8.957 14.150 7.459 11.116
Other 0.543 1.445 0.540 1.641
Intimate 0.216 0.258 0.239 0.299
Anger 1.465 1.916 1.497 2.195
Drugs 0.065 0.271 0.044 0.181
Family 0.052 0.108 0.057 0.125
Gender violence 0.140 0.208 0.158 0.243
Bodily harm 0.284 0.476 0.271 0.500
Disobedience 0.176 0.424 0.167 0.436
Sexual 0.024 0.073 0.023 0.083
Threatening behavior 0.205 0.339 0.222 0.401
Obs 7,008 4,704
Income <90% median 0.671 1
Treatment group 0.245
Source: Our own, constructed from Catalan Police data
Table A6: Descriptive statistic, offense rates per 1,000 inhabitants. 2007-2014
All Neighborhoods Potentially participating
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Men 4.703 8.990 4.492 9.417
Women 1.229 2.278 1.150 1.922
Men under 18 1.387 3.178 1.274 3.331
Men 18-25 14.755 28.065 13.322 28.519
Men 25-35 7.744 19.940 7.717 23.226
Men 35-45 6.038 14.700 6.177 16.887
Men 45-55 4.119 8.677 4.048 9.206
Women under 18 0.540 1.764 0.487 1.575
Women 18-25 4.399 9.488 4.001 9.555
Women 25-35 2.048 4.773 2.045 5.303
Women 35-45 1.584 3.351 1.581 3.611
Women 45-55 1.165 2.934 1.221 3.307
Source: Our own, constructed from Catalan Police data
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Table A7: Descriptive statistics, victim rates per 1,000 inhabitants. 2007-2014
All Neighborhoods Potentially participating
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Men 7.743 10.888 6.848 10.650
Women 6.526 9.311 5.519 7.701
Men under 18 1.366 2.425 1.260 2.563
Men 18-25 16.492 33.832 13.163 32.469
Men 25-35 9.630 16.159 8.584 16.977
Men 35-45 9.167 15.149 8.694 17.224
Men 45-55 14.133 21.686 12.709 22.073
Women under 18 1.545 3.886 1.228 3.528
Women 18-25 19.318 39.312 15.172 37.343
Women 25-35 8.603 12.291 7.620 12.024
Women 35-45 7.015 9.390 6.354 9.275
Women 45-55 11.198 17.678 9.856 16.704
Source: Our own, constructed from Catalan Police data
Table A8: Descriptive statistics, control variables. 2007-2014.
All Neighborhoods Potentially participating
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
New associations (number) 7,008 0.765 1.30 4,704 0.522 0.99
Tourism (tickets/population) 7,008 1.92 7.98 4,704 2.39 9.54
Reg. unemployment (rate) 5,256 0.07 0.02 3,528 0.08 0.02
House prices (euros/sqm) 4,762 2,362 1,005 3,087 2,023 893
Source: Our own, constructed from Barcelona City Hall data. Neighborhoods that potentially
participated are those with an average income below 90% of the city median.
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Table A9: Logit regression pre-intervention
P(Treatment)=1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
Rent -0.12 0.15 -0.64 0.520
Population 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.490
Mortality 0.06 0.06 1.11 0.68
Teenage birth rate 0.01 0.34 0.03 0.976
Non-Spanish population 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.333
Pensions -0.02 0.03 -0.61 0.544
House prices 0.52 0.71 0.74 0.461
Overall crime 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.958
Associations -0.41 0.62 -0.66 0.509
Tourism 0.07 0.11 0.61 0.540
Prob LR>chi2 =0.0000 ; Pseudo R2=0.7554
Note: Robust standard errors. Data from Barcelona City Hall.
Table A10: Panel logit regression for intervention timing
P(BSaB)=1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
Rent 0.03 0.29 0.090 0.925
Population 0.00 0.00 -0.880 0.377
Mortality 0.02 0.02 1.350 0.178
Teenage birth rate 0.40 0.34 1.180 0.239
Non-Spanish population 0.00 0.00 0.880 0.378
Pensions -0.04 0.04 -1.200 0.230
House prices -0.51 0.19 -2.730 0.006
Overall crime 0.00 0.00 1.140 0.253
Associations 0.42 0.55 0.770 0.440
Tourism 0.04 0.13 -0.06 0.956
/lnsig2u 5.26 0.53
sigma u 13.89 3.66
rho 0.98 0.009
Prob W>chi2 =0.01056 ; Prob LR (rho=0)>chi2 =0
Note: Robust standard errors. Data from Barcelona City Hall.
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Additional descriptive statistics
Table A11: Crime distribution per victim characteristics
All By Gender By Age
Women Men <18 18-25 25-35 35-45 45-55
Anger 21.37 18.73 23.61 23.2 18.64 22.69 23.95 22.24
Intimate 4.76 7.87 2.12 11.82 4.4 5.75 6.28 3.4
Criminal damages 8.57 6.41 10.4 0.67 4.33 8.23 10.08 11.03
Bodily harm 6.12 4.45 7.54 14.92 8.46 7.05 5.8 4.5
Law 1.44 1.9 1.05 1.37 1.43 1.63 1.72 1.4
Threatening behavior 5.24 5.97 4.62 6.24 4.42 5.78 6.35 5.31
Family 1.12 1.39 0.89 0.83 0.33 1.46 2.34 0.91
Gender 3.05 5.37 1.08 5.76 3.24 3.8 3.56 2.29
Sexual 0.59 1.11 0.15 5.23 0.83 0.49 0.38 0.2
Drugs 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.21 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.05
Source: Our own, constructed from Catalan Police data
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